Math 486. Oct. 1,  2009. Midterm 1.                                                                                                                        
5 problems, 15 pts each.                      Name____________________                         
 m1 .....   /75.  total    ................./.....
       
Return this page. Write your name  on the class list, above, and on every additional paper you use. 

Find an equilibrium in pure strategies and the corresponding payoff. In Problems 1 and 2, the bet is $1.

1. Restricted Nim. Last move wins. Players alternate and can take 1,5, or 6 stones in a move from a pile. Initial position: 2 piles, 10 and 20 stones.

2. Blackjack. Player (P)  has hard 17. Dealer (D)  shows 10.  Cards remaining including D's face-down are 4, 5, 7, 7,7.

3. 2 player game in normal form.
-7, 1 4,0 -1, 3 0,0 3, 3-3,4
5,-1 5,0 -2, 5 1, 4
3,10,0
0, 5 4,-1 -2, 4 6, 0 0, 31,1
1,6 5,0 0, 3 6,0 3,53,3

4. Extensive form, 3 players, A B, C.
                              initial position  B
                              
                     /                                         \
                 /                                                 \
            A                                                      B
        /          \                                               /        \
      B             C                                         B           C
    /      \      /          \                                 /      \     /         \
 1,2,3   0,-1,0    -1,-2,1                -1,0,1    2,1,0      0,0,2

5.  Game with 3 players, A, B, C. in normal form.
strategy               payoff
A  B  C             A   B   C
1   1  1               0 -1    1
1  1  2                1   1  -2
1  2  1                1   0    0
1  2  2                0   0    1
2   1  1               0 -1    1
2  1  2                1   1  -2
2  2  1                1   0  -1
2  2  2              -1   1    0
3   1  1               0 -1    1
3  1  2               -1   1  -2
3  2  1                1   0    0
3  2  2              -1    0    1